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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RONALD IAN BOATWRIGHT
                   Ronald Boatwright,
                                                       Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-03-cr-00361-001)
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 3, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 24, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Ronald Boatwright appeals the judgment of the District Court denying his request
for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we recount only those facts essential
to our decision.
In 2003 Boatwright pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count I), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count II).  The
presentence report calculated Boatwright’s total offense level for Count I to be 19 after
deducting three points for acceptance of responsibility.  When combined with a criminal
history category of IV, Boatwright’s imprisonment range under the then-mandatory
United States Sentencing Guidelines was 46 to 57 months.  On the firearm offense,
Boatwright faced a statutory mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment, which had
to be imposed consecutively to the drug count.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I).  The
District Court sentenced Boatwright to 84 months, which was comprised of 24 months for
the drug offense (a 48% reduction from the bottom of the Guidelines range), plus 60
months for the gun offense.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a defendant can seek the benefit of an amendment1
by a motion to modify his sentence.  The United States Sentencing Commission has
authority to amend the guidelines, 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), and to provide that any amendment
has retroactive effect.  § 994(u).
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A.
In March 2008, Boatwright filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and USSG § 1B1.10, based on Amendment 706, which amended the
Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses by retroactively ordering a two-level reduction in
the offense level.   As§ 1B1.10 of the Guidelines states: a court “may reduce the1
defendant’s term of imprisonment” when “the guideline range applicable to that
defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines
manual listed in subsection (c) below.”  Amendment 706 is listed in subsection (c);
nevertheless, § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) plainly states that “if the original term of imprisonment
constituted a non-guideline sentence determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a further reduction generally would not be
appropriate.”  Id.
Boatwright argues that his original sentence was a Guidelines sentence because
Judge Caldwell stated that he was using the Guidelines “as a measure,” but noted that he
was “going to vary that somewhat.”  We disagree.
Contrary to Boatwright’s argument, the language he cites shows that the District
Court was not relying on the Guidelines in imposing the sentence.  Although Booker had
In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which involved a state criminal2
statute, the Supreme Court held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 301.
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not been decided when Boatwright was sentenced, Judge Caldwell presciently anticipated
the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker and declined to impose a Guidelines sentence,
correctly predicting that “the Blakely decision will be extended to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 7.   Additionally, Judge Caldwell noted that if he had been2
required to apply a Guidelines sentence, he would have imposed a sentence of 46 months
for the drug offense, and 60 months for the firearm offense, for a total of 106 months
imprisonment.  Taken together, these statements demonstrate that the District Court did
not adhere to the Guidelines in imposing its sentence.  Thus, under § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B), a
sentencing reduction would not be appropriate.
B.
Boatwright next argues that the District Court improperly interpreted
§ 1B1.10(b)(2) to deprive it of the power to further reduce Boatwright’s non-Guidelines
sentence.  Boatwright argues that § 1B1.10(b)(2) is merely an advisory policy statement,
and to hold otherwise would violate Booker and United States v. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct.
558 (2007).  Our review of the record leads us to the opposite conclusion.  Judge
Caldwell did not believe that § 1B1.10(b)(2) removed his discretion to reduce
Boatwright’s sentence, because he stated: “We decline to grant a further reduction.”  Dist.
5Ct. Op. at 6.  The District Court noted that § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) “advises that if the original
sentence was a non-guideline one . . . further reduction ‘generally’ is not appropriate.” 
Again, the record shows that the District Court understood that § 1B1.10(b)(2) was
advisory, and that it chose not to reduce further Boatwright’s sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
